We examine the use of Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code, a piece of tax law that allows for tax-deferred exchanges of like-kind property. Significant interest in Section 1031 exists from stakeholders in rural communities because there is widespread belief that the recent growth in farmland values may have, in part, been stimulated by Section 1031 exchanges of farmland. Despite these concerns, little is know about the extent of such exchanges. We derive a theoretical premium value for exchanges and present the first national level analysis of Federal tax data on the use of like-kind exchanges involving farmland between 1999 and 2005.
INTRODUCTION
While a growing body of research has looked at a number of factors to explain this rapid growth in farmland values, such as biofuels policy, a provision of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that allows for tax-deferred exchanges of like-kind property (Section 1031) is believed to have played a part has received relatively little analysis.
Section 1031 of the IRC permits taxpayers to defer the recognition of gains or losses for tax purposes from the disposition of property if the taxpayer engages in an exchange of like-kind property.
The potential effect on farmland values from Section 1031 derives from the fact that, under the provision, landowners may defer into the future the payment of taxes on capital gains from the disposition of property. Further, the provision imposes strict time limits on the exchange. Section 1031 requires that a replacement property be identified within 45 days of the sale of the previous property and that the exchange is completed within 180 days. Coupled with the fact that a relatively small amount of existing farmland acreage (less than 2%) is available for purchase in any given year, 1 1 Authors' calculation from the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey, USDA, Census of the Agriculture. someone planning to acquire land in order to complete an exchange may be compelled by the value of the deferral, which is essentially a free loan to the exchanger, and time pressure to pay more for a piece of property than someone that is purchasing the land without the tax advantage or time constraints. Therefore, Section 1031 could have provided a pathway for the housing bubble, which accelerated the sale of farmland for residential and commercial development, to affect farmland values.
The use of like-kind exchanges in all types of real estate increased significantly in the late 1990's, perhaps because of several IRS Revenue Procedures which reduced the uncertainty of conducting a successful exchange. Recent research has shown that buyers who are acquiring property as part of a like-kind exchange pay more for commercial property and take on more risk than buyers not exchanging property (Holmes and Slade
2001; Ling and Petrova 2008).
There are many reasons for concern about the provision. In general, the tax provision distorts behavior of the asset holder because it encourages people to hold assets longer than they would without the tax advantage. The deferral also encourages investors to hold assets that are eligible for deferral, particularly real property. While many parties have speculated about the extent and degree to which real farm property was being disposed of through like-kind exchanges and its effect on farmland values, there has been limited research on the topic. There are many stakeholders who are concerned that Section 1031 causes distortionary effects in the market for farmland. First, there is the issue of intergenerational-equity. Concerns were raised in a 2006 article in the Farm Journal about Section 1031 "shaking up" rural America by creating a competition between young farmers and urban landlords (Bernick 2006) . The article suggested that younger farmers wishing to acquire farmland are often outbid by investors with "1031 money" who are in some cases older farmers who own large, valuable tracts and wish to avoid paying capital gains taxes and preserve their investment in the land through an exchange until they can pass the land to heirs. In this example, Section 1031 makes acquiring land by young and limited resources farmers more difficult.
Finally, section 1031 could have distributional effects if it facilitates the concentration of land ownership. Farmers who wish to pass their investment in farmland to their heirs can use a like-kind exchange to preserve their capital gains in land. Upon transfer of the land in an estate, the heirs receive the benefit of the "stepped-up" basis rule-that is, their basis becomes the fair market value of the land on the date of the decedent's death. This effect would be particularly pronounced in areas where farmland is under pressure from residential and commercial development. Despite the claims, little is known about the true volume of such exchanges.
In this article, we address some of these concerns to the extent the data allow.
First, we develop a theoretical model of farmland exchange that derives the value of an exchange relative to a sale-purchase strategy for a plausible range of farmland sale scenarios.
2 Our model reveals how much more a rational agent would be willing to pay for a parcel when using an exchange. Recently, Ling and Petrova (2008) study the effect of tax-deferred exchanges on transaction prices in multiple commercial real estate markets, focusing on the theoretical reservation price and observed market price. Their theoretical premium of such an exchange suggests a 5-10% price effect due to the tax-deferral. Empirically, results show that taxpayers pay a price premium to acquire the replacement property of 5-35%, depending on the local market-a figure far higher in many cases than their theoretical model predicts.
MODEL
The first step in examining the potential effect of Section 1031 on transaction prices of farmland is to calculate the value of an exchange relative to a sale and purchase for a plausible range of farmland sale scenarios. This reveals how much more a rational agent would be willing to pay for a parcel when using an exchange as opposed to a sale and purchase, which we refer to as the exchange premium. To estimate the exchange premium we modify the model presented in Ling and Petrova to consider only
[farm]land. This simplifies the analysis because it minimizes the importance of capital depreciation that is much more relevant when buildings, rather than land, constitute a majority of the property value.
To estimate the potential effect of exchanges on land values we consider a scenario where a hypothetical landowner acquires a property in period t-m that is relinquished in period t, at which point a second property is acquired that is then sold in period t+n. In the sale-purchase scenario, the first property is sold and tax is paid on the increased value of the land over the holding period, or the capital gains. Following the sale, a second property is acquired that is equivalent in value to what remains after taxes and transaction costs are paid. Alternatively, the owner can perform an exchange and defer paying capital gains tax to period t+n when the second property is sold.
6
Deferring the capital gains tax to a later period means that the landowner has the full value of the disposition of the first property to invest in the second. As a result, the Assuming no additional financing is available, an exchange leaves the landowner with more funds to acquire a second property than when using a sale-purchase. When the second property is sold capital gains are based on the original basis, or the value of the first property in period t-m. 6 We do not consider the option of performing another exchange for the second property.
value of their investment in the second property will be greater at time t+n for an exchange than for a sale-purchase assuming an equivalent rate of return because their initial investment was larger at time t. Second, the ability to acquire a larger parcel of farmland or land that is of higher value per acre means that the exchanger will receive more in rental payments each year.
Equations (1) and (2) show the present value of a sale-purchase and an exchange in period t. Recall that the value of the original property is equivalent for an exchange and sale-purchase, and we formulate the expressions as being on a per acre basis.
(1
[ ]
For a sale, equation (1) captures the amount received from the sale of the first property minus the capital gains tax due, the price paid for the second property, and the cost of the sale:
The sale price of the relinquished property at time t is 1 t P ; 1 m t P − represents the owner's adjusted basis in the relinquished property, the capital gains tax rate is cg τ , and S t P is the purchase price of the replacement property using the sale-purchase strategy.
S t
C is the transaction cost of the sale. This is followed by the rent, S i R , received each year per acre for the second property following a sale-purchase that is taxed as income according to the individual's marginal tax rate o τ .
The last term is the value of the sale of the replacement property in period t+n discounted to period t.
The value of an exchange, shown in (2), differs from (1) to reflect the fact that capital gains taxes are not paid after the first property is relinquished. Equation (3) accounts for the discount rate δ and the discount factor β . Since we assume that all of the proceeds of the sale of the first property are used to acquire the second property, the value of the second property acquired when using an exchange will be of greater value than a sale. This is embodied in equation (5), which we call the "no free money" restriction that rules out any outside financing in acquiring the second property. Equation (6) is the assumption that transaction costs are equal. Equation (7) provides the basis for the remainder of the analysis by capturing the premium placed on an exchange by subtracting the present value of the sale from that of the exchange in period t.
(The price of the replacement property is equal to the price of the relinquished property, i.e., investment is rolled into a new vehicle.)
In equation (7), the first quantity captures the difference in the rental payment received when using an exchange versus a sale-purchase that follows from equation (5).
The second term in equation (7) reflects the benefit from being able to defer the cost of paying capital gains tax into the future.
An Illustrative Example
Before providing a full theoretical exposition of the exchange premium it helps to get a sense of what it would be for a typical case. Values are chosen to reflect what one would likely find for a landowner who is a retired farmer selling a parcel of farmland with little development pressure that they have owned for a long time and plans to hold a second investment property for less than ten years. Examining the second term in equation (7), consider a scenario where a property increases from $1,000 to $4,000 per acre from t-m to t. Using a like-kind exchange, the seller delays paying capital gains tax and acquires a property of the same value per unit, or $4,000. A sale-purchase with no additional financing allows the seller to acquire a second property worth only $3,550 per acre ($4,000 per acre minus capital gains taxes due of $450 per acre). The tax bill when selling this replacement property in t+n is based on the realized gains from t-m to t+n. If the second property for both the exchange and the sale increase in value by 20% from t to t+n the exchange and the sale properties are worth $4,800 per acre and $4,260 per acre, respectively. If the tax rate on capital gains is 15%, the tax due in period t+n when using an exchange is $570 per acre. The same value for a sale-purchase is $106.50 per acre since the basis is the value of the second property in t rather than t-m. Assuming a typical discount rate of 3% and n=5, the present value of the second term in (7) in period t is $66 per acre.
To estimate the exchange premium derived from the rent portion of (7) we assume that the value of the second property acquired through an exchange or a salepurchase in period t is equal to the present value of the discounted infinite stream of annual rental payments. This implicitly assumes that the second property acquired has little or no expectation of being used for anything other than agriculture. Incorporating the option value of development to a non-agricultural use would greatly complicate the analysis. The present value of the infinite stream of rental payments increasing at a rate of ω and discounted by δ for an exchange and a sale-purchase is shown in (8) and (9), respectively.
Isolating the rent term in (7) and substituting using (4), (5), (8), and (9) gives (10) )) (
Continuing with the same hypothetical case, where the holding period of the second property is 5 years, the landowner's marginal income tax rate is 33%, and also assuming that cash rents increase 1.5% per year (ω =0.015), the value of (10) comes to $41.
Combining the results from both parts of equation (7), the premium placed on an exchange in this scenario is just over $100. For comparison, rent per acre for cropland in the Cornbelt ranged from $100 to $165 in 2008 7 That said, there are two reasons why Section 1031 could still have a significant effect on farmland prices. First, farmland that has come under development pressure can sell for many times more than land that is likely to stay in agriculture.
. 8 7 http://www.nass.usda.gov/Charts_and_Maps/Land_Values_and_Cash_Rents/crop_rent_map.asp As was explained previously, the design of Section 1031 and the nature of farmland real estate can coalesce to allow a small number of landowners with large exchange premiums to affect land values significantly. Second, previous research on commercial real estate has found that investors often do not act rationally. They overestimate the value of deferring payment of taxes on capital gains.
General Model
Further substitutions are required to explicitly capture the effect of the choice parameters on the exchange premium. Choice parameters include the capital gains tax rate, the income tax rate, the discount rate, and the change in value of the original and second properties. Equations (11) and (12) 
After substitutions, the general exchange premium is shown in (17). (17) [ ]
Comparative Statics
The first-order conditions of (18) with respect to the ordinary income tax rate and the capital gains tax rate are shown in (19) and (20) (19)
Considering the effect of the ordinary income tax rate on the value of the exchange premium requires evaluating the condition for several states of the value γ, the growth in the value of the relinquished property from time t-m to t.
When value of the relinquished property grows by less than 100% from the original basis (γ<1), the derivative of the exchange premium with respect to the income tax rate is positive. The value of an exchange premium is negatively related to the income tax rate when γ is greater than one, or stated another way, when the value of the relinquished property has increased by more than 100%. Providing some intuition, this occurs because the more the relinquished property increases in value the greater is the difference in the stream of rents that are derived from the replacement property for an exchange relative to a salepurchase; hence, because of capital gains tax due in a sale-purchase arrangement, the value of the replacement property will be lower. The result comes from equation (13): When the growth rate is below 1, , and because
, it follows 9 We only consider positive and nonzero values of γ.
that the difference between the rents will be negative. In the last case where γ=1, the sign is zero.
Table 1 Summary of Comparative Statics
States of growth
To evaluate the effect of a change in the capital gains tax rate on the exchange premium, the cases must be evaluated based on several parameters. The direction of the effect can be either positive or negative depending on what piece of the equation dominates, which is largely determined by the change in value of the property, the rental income ratio, and the discount rate. Limiting the cases considered to the most relevant makes it possible to define this relationship. First, it is easy to see that when γ and α equal one, the derivative with respect to the capital gains tax rate is zero. If both properties increase in value by more than 100%, then an increase in the capital gains tax rate increases the exchange premium, as is shown in (21). Table 1 summarizes the results.
We now extend this case further for a range of values of γ and α greater than 1. 
ANALYSIS OF FARMLAND EXCHANGES
We now turn from our analysis of the theory of an exchange to present a descriptive study of the disposition of real farm property using Federal tax data. We Based on the taxpayers description of the like-kind properties involved in the exchange, we classify the property as farm-ranchland or other type of like-kind property.
Time series analysis of exchanges
Overall, the number of like-kind exchanges has grown substantially in recent years. Between 1999 and 2003, total reported like-kind exchanges involving any type of asset increased by 60 percent from just over 116,000 to more than 186,000. As expected, however, exchanges involving farmland represent a relatively small share of the total. At the same time, exchanges generally involve larger transactions in terms of dollar value.
While farmers engage in a number of like-kind exchanges, the majority of exchanges involving farmland are by non-farmers. However, exchanges by non-farmers tend to involve smaller amounts with less gain to defer. 
Year-to-year exchange volume was volatile
The first line of the table reports total number of like-kind exchanges reported by taxpayers in each tax year, regardless of asset type. The rows that follow describe the three types of exchange scenarios involving farmland that we consider. These include:
(1) farmland exchanged for another type of like-kind property, for example, residential rental property or timberland; (2) farmland exchanged for other farmland; (3) other property exchanged for farmland.
The data reveal several distinctive characteristics of exchanges involving farmland. The first feature that stands out is the volume data generally show high yearto-year variability. In 1999, for example, like-kind exchanges involving farmland were the largest, both in absolute and relative terms. While overall like-kind exchanges have continually grown in every year but one since 1999, the number of farmland exchanges was more than twice as great as the next highest year, 2002, and accounted for 7% of all like-kind exchanges. 
Farmland-for-Farmland exchanges were the dominant form of exchange
The theory of an exchange premium that supposes that farmland is more often than not exchanged for farmland is supported by the tax evidence. In 1999, the year in 12 We have investigated the low value of farmland exchanged for farmland in 2003. Based on personal communications with SOI programmers, the figure reflects the value of weights in that year.
our data with the greatest number of total exchanges involving farmland, there were 5,022 farm-to-farm exchanges out of 7,566 exchanges involving farmland. In 2002, exchanges of farmland-for-farmland accounted for 97% of exchanges involving any farmland. Over entire sample period, 77% of exchanges involving farmland were of the category farmland-to-farmland. Clearly, the evidence from the exchange volume shows Section 1031 is an important provision for landowners of farmland who wish to "roll over" or maintain their investment in farmland. As explained in the beginning, this is an important factor in leading to the capitalization of the exchange premium into farmland values given the relatively small amount of farmland sold over time.
The data also reveal that so-called "outside investors" exchanging other assets for farmland is relatively insignificant, either in terms of volume or value, and therefore of economic significance. This type of exchange is thought to be conducted mostly by nonfarmers who hold the asset for strictly investment reasons, and use the farmland for reasons such as residential development, rather than using it in an agricultural capacity; however, exchanges whereby other property is exchanged for farmland are rare. In 2000, the year with the greatest number of such exchanges, 138, they only accounted for 5% of exchanges involving farmland. Over the entire period for which we have data, they accounted for less than 2% of exchanges involving farmland. The data should reassure some that Section 1031 is not being used by those more likely to own non-farm property and exchange it for farmland for speculative purposes, thus adding to the price pressure on farmland. Further, as we will see later in this section, the value of these types of exchanges is relatively to other types of exchanges involving farmland.
Like the farmland-for-farmland exchanges, exchanges where farmland was exchanged for other property was noticeable high in 1999 relative to the other years in the data. Despite this, these exchanges account for a minority of exchanges. In 1999, 2,539 such exchanges were conducted-about 34% of all exchanges involving farmland.
And like the other exchanges, the exchange volume fell precipitously after 1999.
Sale of farm real property outnumbered exchanges by a wide margin in every year of the study
To provide perspective on the relative importance of an exchange as a mode of disposition, Table 3 presents long-term and short-term gains involving farmland. From the data we can see the sale of farmland is the primary method for disposing of farmland.
In 1999, for every exchange involving farmland, nearly 7 sales took place. And, while neither the long-term nor short-term data show a clear year-to-year pattern, the volume of sales is less volatile over time than exchanges, and over the five-year period sales volume rose 33%. The FMV of property received in an exchange involving farmland is presented in Table 4 . The value data generally follow the trend of the volume data. As we saw The average deferral amount from an exchange was greater than average gain amount from a sale.
Just how valuable are exchanges to those who dispose of farmland? Evidence is presented in Table 5 . Telling of the true value to the taxpayer is the deferred gain-the difference in the FMV of the property received in an exchange and the adjusted basis of the property relinquished, plus any addition "boot." In 1999, more than $3.3 billion in gains were deferred, and most of the gains were from farmland-to-farmland exchanges.
A taxpayer who exchanged farmland for farmland deferred an average of $577,210 in gains. For comparison, as reported in Table 6 , in 1999, a taxpayer who sold farmland and recognized a long-term gain realized only $35,290 of gain. In subsequent years, the amount of deferred gains was much lower than in 1999. At their lowest point in the data,
2001
, only $173 million-a small fraction of the amount in 1999-was deferred using an exchange.
As we described earlier when we developed a premium for exchanging land versus a sale-purchase strategy, landowners who wish to dispose of land also have the option of selling the land, and if there is a gain (or loss), recognizing it for tax purposes.
While the average deferred amount of an exchange involving farmland was higher than the average gain from a sale, the total amount of gains from farmland sales were higher than the gains from an exchange in every year but 1999. This follows from the fact that sales of farmland are used more frequently-and an order of magnitude higher in some cases-than exchanges of farmland. The tax benefit of the gain deferred in an exchange is, generally, the deferred gain amount multiplied by the long-term capital gains rate of 15%, because the average holding period of farmland is usually quite long. For example, the holding period for property relinquished in a farmland-to-farmland exchange was 25.9 years in 1999; therefore, in sum, taxpayers saved $491 million in taxes dues, or an average of $65,000.
Again, landowners of farmland who exchanged their property for other farmland received the greatest tax benefit: $435 million in deferred taxes. In such a case, the average landowner received $86,600 in tax benefits. On the other hand, taxpayers who chose to sell their property paid $21 million in taxes on their gains in 1999. 13 On average, across the five years of reported data, they paid an average of $5,200 in capital gains taxes.
More non-farmers exchange farmland but farmers defer more gains Despite making up less than 2% of the workforce, farmers conducted 24% of the farmland-for-farmland exchanges. Depending on the orientation, the difference in the number of exchanges conducted by farmers and non-farmers might be surprising. From the point of view of an economic or business interest, on the other hand, we might expect farmers to own a majority of the farmland in the US and therefore exchange most of the farmland, particularly when the exchange is farmland-for-farmland. Based on evidence from the 1999 Agriculture and Economics Land Ownership Survey, non-operators owned 51% of the 434 million acres of cropland in the US (ERS 2003) . Though the data on land ownership and land rental are not available to further describe non-farmers, many are likely retired operators that do not participate in the farm operation or report farm income and would not be considered farmers for tax purposes.
Non-farmers (non-operators) on average are more likely to hold farmland as an investment. Thus, the average value of farmland-for-farmland exchanges was smaller for non-farmers, which would suggests that smaller amounts of farmland were exchanged.
In an average exchange, non-farmers received land worth about $303,000, while farmers received land worth $918,000 on average.
The value of Section 1031 is much greater for farmers than non-farmers. Farmers likely exchanged more in terms of acreage, and the spread between the FMV of the received property and the adjusted basis of the property relinquished was also much larger. Despite the fact that non-farmers conducted more than three times the farmlandfor-farmland exchanges, farmers deferred nearly twice as much gain. Farmers deferred The gains recognized by taxpayers in an exchange generally include any cash received, as well as the fair market value of other property received plus any net liabilities assumed by the other party, all reduced by incurred exchange expenses. In farmland-for-farmland exchanges, gains recognized by farmers were slightly larger than the gains they deferred; non-farmers recognized much less in gains than they deferred.
On average, farmers and non-farmers recognized gains of $768,731 and $16,840, respectively.
like-kind exchanges and pressure on farmland prices
Is it the case that "1031 money" chasing a limited amount of farmland is responsible for placing upward pressure on farmland values? Unfortunately, we do not have the microdata help to answer this question. What we can do is rely on the theoretical premium developed in the first half of the paper together with the relative size of the exchanges to make inferences about their importance. Despite these limitations our analysis still reveals a number of important findings that shed a great deal of light on this important question relative to what was known previously. This also highlights important questions for further research using less aggregated data if it can be obtained.
To assess the impact of Section 1031 on farmland prices, we evaluate the relative importance of exchanges compared to sales with these questions: Were the exchange premiums large enough, and was the exchange volume high enough to significantly affect land values? The evidence we present in this article is clearly not definitive. We show that the exchange premium can be nonnegligible for some taxpayers, depending on the factors surrounding the assets, such as the size of the gain, holding period or the replacement property, and the tax rates the exchanger faces. From Table 8 , for the peak year in the data, exchanges appear to be significantly large as to affect sale prices of farmland. As a percentage of total sales value, the deferral amounts are can be as high as 43%--as seen in 1999. In the other years, the deferral amount, on average, was closer to 5% of the value of farmland sales. In table 9 we consider changes to the ordinary income and capital gain tax changes and the associated incremental value (net present value) of an exchange. We have labeled the incremental value as the "exchange premium," and the differences , which means retaining the 10%, 25%, 28%, and part of the 33% tax brackets for individual income rates. Second, the budget sunsets ordinary income rates from 2001 for taxpayers in the top two brackets, 33% and 35%. After the sun-set, the marginal rates return to pre-EGTRRA levels of 36% and 39.6%. Finally, the budget creates a new 20% marginal rate for capital gains for taxpayers who would otherwise be in the 36% and 39.6% ordinary income brackets.
14 Economic Growth and Tax between the premiums as a result changes in the tax rates by the President's Budget are reported below. We assume the relinquished property growth rates are γ=4 and α=2, and the holding period of the replacement property is 15 years. From the table, we can see that the exchange premium increases in each scenario-taxpayers would find the premium for exchanging land over conducting a sale-purchase transaction increasing. A taxpayer who initially faces a top marginal income rate of 33% and a capital gains rate of 15% will see property. Important characteristics of the policy have potential consequences for the market for farmland, including requirements that a replacement property be identified within 45 days of the sale of the previous property and that the exchange be completed 16 The taxable income amount for the 33% rate for taxpayer filing a joint return in 2008 was $195,850 to $349,700. The taxable income amount for the 35% rate for a joint return in 2008 was $349,700 or greater.
within 180 days. In this article, we present a theoretical model of like-kind exchange that we adapt from a common formulation, for example, like that of Ling and Petrova (2008) .
We also present the first national analysis of tax data for like-kind exchanges form was the exchange of farmland for farmland. Active farmers were also the minority of exchangers, even when the exchange involved farmland. Non-farmers conducted three times the farmland-for-farmland exchanges as farmers.
Our research provides incite into the value and use of the IRC's Section 1031 provision. Based on simulations of our theoretical model using plausible assumptions about asset growth, we show how proposed tax changes will affect the tax value of the deferral. Future research needs to address this issue with microdata, perhaps, by further exploiting the panel aspect of the SOCA data. To address policy issues concerning the ability of farmers to continue to own farmland, further research is needed to address ownership and sales of real farm property sales.
